H-IBAS-H - Authentication System for University Student Portals Using Images by Al-Sinani, Haitham et al.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, COMPUTER AND POWER (ICCCP'09) MUSCAT, FEBRUARY 15-18, 2009 
 
© SQU-2009 ISSN: 1813-419X - 1 -
Abstract— Nowadays, most of the authentication systems rely on a 
precise recall of passwords and/or personal identifier numbers (PINs). 
As  the  number  of  on-line  services  requiring  authentication  
continues  to  rise  sharply,  the number of passwords needed 
continues  to also rise! The burden on users  to remember such an  
increasing  number  of  passwords  leads  to  poor  and  predictable  
choices  as  users  seek passwords  that  they  can  readily  remember.  
This has a potential security risk that could endanger users’ privacy, 
e.g. identity theft. For certain applications, research suggests that the 
use of images may be a more effective combination of both security 
and ease of use. This is because humans are, by far, better at 
recognising images that they have previously seen than they are at 
remembering passwords.  In addition, it may well be possible to 
improve the usability of authentication systems through the use of 
images. In this paper, an experimental authentication  system,  called          
H-IBAS-H,  has  been  developed  for  use  by  students  when 
authenticating to their University student portal. H-IBAS-H 
authenticates students based on their ability to recognise previously 
seen images.  
 Prior to presenting H-IBAS-H to users, a user questionnaire was 
developed. H-IBAS-H was, then,  tested  on three experiments; a pilot 
survey,   a  one-time  experiment  and  a  four-week  experiment  with  
more than 100 members (both staff and students) of the Department 
of the Electronic and Computer Engineering (ECE) at the University 
of Portsmouth and their feedback has been collected and, 
subsequently, analysed. One of the astonishing results of the user 
testing is that about 94% of the participants succeeded in 
authenticating with H-IBAS-H. This is despite the previous hypothesis 
that only about 50% to 60% were expected to succeed. The H-IBAS-H 
findings illustrate some novel theories  that  are  of  significance  to  
the  study  of image-based  authentication  systems.  An example of 
this is that “flexibility in key generation” is significant to achieve high 
success in image-based authentication systems.   
 
Index Terms— Authentication, challenge-set, decoy-images,      
image-based authentication, pass-images, sampling. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Authentication definitions  
UTHENTICATION can be defined as the process of verification 
that someone is actually who they claim they are [1].  In  other 
words, authentication  is  the  act  of  establishing  or  confirming 
something (or someone) as authentic,  i.e.,  that claims made by or 
about  the  thing or  the one are  true  [2].  In  another  resource,  
authentication  is  defined  as  the  process  of  determining whether 
someone or something  is, in fact, who or what  it  is declared  to be 
[3]. Authentication is needed to let the system perform some tasks for 
the user. The user needs to be authorized to request services from the 
system”[4]. Thus,  it  could  be  concluded  that  the  authentication  is  
simply  the  process  of  establishing  a level  of  confidence  regarding  
a  claim [5].  
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Since  the  authentication  basically  verifies  a  claim,  it  can  be  
rightly  assumed  that  the authentication is made up of two main 
parties; a claimer and a verifier (usually this is the issuer as well)[5].    
1.2. Authentication types  
Human authentication factors are generally classified into three 
cases; something the user knows (e.g. password), something the user 
has (e.g.  ID card) and something the user is or does (e.g. fingerprint 
[5, 7]).  Hence, the authentication can take the form of one or more of 
the following:  
1. “Knowledge-based systems”.    
2. “Biometric-based systems”.    
3. “Token-based systems” [6].    
Often  a  combination  of  these  methods  is  used,  in  which  case  
the term  "two-factor authentication" is used. [5] A traditional example 
of this is the use of a bank card and a PIN at the ATM machines.  
1.3. Weaknesses of existing authentication systems  
By far the most  common  form of authentication  is knowledge-
based  systems, of which  the most  widely  used  type  is  text-based  
authentication  systems  [4, 6, 8, 9, 10].  Although biometrics  can  
demonstrate  valuable  use  for  user  authentication,  it    yet  to  suffer  
from  a number  of  drawbacks  such  as  that  if  it  is  not  totally  
unchangeable,  then  it  is  difficult  to change and maintain[4]. In 
addition, many biometric systems require specialised devices and can 
be unpleasant to use. Additional hardware undoubtedly means 
additional cost, which raises questions about whether they are 
affordable, in particular to the every day users.   
Token-based systems are, also, not perfect solutions since they can 
be easily lost or stolen. Therefore, many token-based systems employ 
knowledge-based authentication systems to prevent impersonation 
through theft or loss of the token [6].  
Despite their common use and their world-wide popularity, text-
based systems, particularly passwords and PINs, experience a number 
of shortcomings. On the one hand, simple, short and/or meaningful 
passwords are easier to remember but vulnerable to attacks. These 
attacks can be as a result of a guess due to the predictability of the 
humans’ behaviour or can be as a result of  the  technology  using  
brute  force  attacks  like  attempting  different  passwords  (on-line 
attacks) or by off-line attacks on  the password hash  file. On the other 
hand, arbitrary and complex passwords are more secure but, however, 
they are more difficult to remember. Yet, brute force attacks are still 
applicable here. Since users can only remember a limited number of 
passwords, they tend to write them down. What is even more 
disastrous, which can result in  a  total  fiasco,  is  that  some  users 
would  simply  and  foolishly  use  almost  similar  if  not exactly  
identical passwords for applications which require a higher  level of 
security such as bank accounts and for applications which are not very 
critical such as the infrequently-visited websites. 
1.4. Proposed countermeasures for passwords weaknesses  
Almost countless attempts have been made to suggest solutions 
that are capable of addressing the weaknesses of the passwords. The 
majority of these solutions can be grouped in a number of distinct 
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categorizes. The first being the employment of strict password polices 
where users are, for example,  required  to  update  their  passwords  
on  a  weekly  basis.  In many situations, this technique miserably 
backfired to its proposers since users started to come up with some 
tricks to counter such strict policies.  For  instance,  whenever  there  is  
a  requirement  for  updating passwords,  they would  just make  a  
variation  on  the  old  password  or  reuse  some  other  older 
passwords or simply swap them with their friends or family or they 
would go all the way to write them down if necessary.   
The  other  solution  is  the  usage  of  proactive  security measures  
that  aim  to  identify  weak passwords by  constantly  running 
password  cracking programs, such as 'John the ripper, JTR'. Another  
approach, which  is still  technical  in  nature,  utilizes  techniques  to  
increase  the  computational  overhead  of cracking  passwords.  
Furthermore,  another  group  of  solutions  includes  user  training  
and education  to  increase  security  awareness  and  to  establish  
security  guidelines  and  rules  for users to follow. “Unfortunately, all 
these proposed solutions do not remedy the main cause of password  
insecurity,  which  is  the  human  limitation  in  terms  of  memory  
for  secure passwords” [6]. 
1.5. Authentication systems and idealism  
The reality is that no one could, at least currently, claim that a 
particular authentication system is the ideal system that can perfectly 
fit all environments, wonderfully serve all purposes, or work best 
under all circumstances. The reasonable  argument  is  that  a  
particular  authentication system should work  the best  to  its potential 
when specifically designed  to serve a particular environment under 
certain and predefined conditions.  
1.6. The case of image-based authentication systems  
Analysing the solutions that are intended to address the 
weaknesses that the character-based authentication  systems  suffer  
from  lead  to  one  obvious  conclusion;  those  solutions  have  a 
common weakness shared between all of them and that is their 
negligence of the significance of  the human  limitation in  terms of 
memory. This negligence negatively and severely impacts on humans’ 
ability to remember the character-based passwords [6]. From this, a 
relatively recent wave of solutions has erupted. What makes  these  
solutions  special  is  the  fact  that  they  signify  the principle that 
humans have a limitation in terms of memory and have, therefore, 
introduced a newer  way  of  coping  with  the  passwords'  
weaknesses  and  that  is;  recognise  rather  than remember!  Such  
systems  are  known  as  “recognition-based  systems”  and  their  idea  
has originated  from  an  interesting  but  a  scientifically-proven  fact,  
which  simply  states  that humans have a far greater capacity for 
recognition  than  they do for recall. In other words, a user is far more 
adept at recognising an image that they have previously seen than 
recalling a word or a phrase that they have attempted to commit to 
memory [6, 7, 8, 9, 11].  
On  the  top of  them being easy on humans  in  terms of reducing 
the need to memorise more passwords, other advantages which make 
the use of image-based authentication systems attractive  is  that  they 
are  simple  enough,  cost  effective,  do  not  require  any  additional  
hardware  and  more interestingly they are fun to use [6]! 
 
2. H-IBAS-H 
This paper proposes an experimental authentication system, named 
as H-IBAS-H. The name ‘H-IBAS-H’ is simple enough that it comes 
from the first letters of “Image Based Authentication System”, which 
make up IBAS, and the two Hs represent the first letter of the system 
developer, i.e. “Haitham”.  H-IBAS-H is designed so that it aims to 
achieve the following:  
 Minimise the user’s cognitive load.    
 Help the user make fewer mistakes.    
 Prevent users from choosing weak passwords.    
 Make it difficult to write passwords down or share passwords 
or describe passwords with or to others.  
 Provide more pleasant experience, i.e. Make H-IBAS-H fun 
to use!   
2.1. Primary user of H-IBAS-H 
H-IBAS-H is designed primarily to be the login system 
authenticating the University students to their student portals. 
2.2. H-IBAS-H stages 
H-IBAS-H is made up of two main stages; the first is the 
registration stage, which is considered to include the training part, and 
the second stage is the authentication stage. 
2.2.1. The registration stage 
At the registration stage, the users are required to fill in their 
details such as their 'unique' username, their 'valid' e-mail addresses 
and any other details marked with *. They, also, have to select the 
correct amount of pass-images. If the offered images do not appeal 
them, they can refresh the registration page as many times as they 
wish to view more and more images, until they find images that they 
are comfortable with. Then, upon entering their details and choosing 
their images, they may click 'submit' to move on to the training phase 
where they have to correctly identify their pass-images from among a 
mixture of decoy images.  
2.2.2. The authentication stage   
H-IBAS-H puts forward a novel authentication algorithm such 
that the pass-images are randomly distributed on the login rounds. 
Therefore, every round may have all, some or none of the              
pass-images. At least, one login round must contain no pass-images, to 
battle the intersection attack. 
2.3. H-IBAS-H modes  
H-IBAS-H can work on a pre-set and/or a flexible mode. 
2.3.1. Pre-set mode 
The H-IBAS-H administrator, in this mode, takes responsibility in 
setting the number of the pass-images and the number of the training 
and the login rounds that the student must go through as well as setting 
the number of the permissible attempts to retry to authenticate in case 
of failure.  
2.3.2. Flexible mode 
All the features included in the pre-set mode are, also, applicable 
here but to provide maximum flexibility, the settings for the number of 
the pass-images, the login and the training rounds lay within the 
users’ responsibilities. 
3. H-IBAS-H JUSTIFICATIONS 
3.1. The use of random art 
H-IBAS-H  uses  random  art  images  as  they  have  the  
advantage  that  whilst  they  are identifiable,  they  are  extremely  
hard  to  describe.  
3.2. H-IBAS-H is made configurable  
Given the flexibility provided by H-IBAS-H's  flexible mode, and 
with the additional facts that the size of  the challenge-sets  as well as  
the number  of  allowable  login  attempts  could  be  configured  upon  
the  user’s  request, it could be stated that H-IBAS-H has the 
additional benefit of providing a flexible authentication framework 
that can handle various situations. 
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 3.3. Adaptation of the multiple-round technique  
H-IBAS-H attempts to improve the security by adopting some 
methods, in which, there are no necessity to further increase either the 
size of the challenge-set or the number of the pass-images. One such 
method is the use of more than one authentication round. In this case, 
the authentication is split up into multiple rounds. Each round presents 
a challenge-set including all or some or none of the pass-images. The 
probability of  a random attack  succeeding  would  then  be  given  by  
the  combined  probability  of  successes  in  each round. 
3.4. Keeping the number of the login rounds configurable  
If the system “H-IBAS-H” is restricted to have one image per 
login round, an attacker would easily be able to deduce the number of 
the pass-images since the number of the login rounds is equal to the 
number of the pass-images. As a countermeasure, the approach of 
keeping the number of authentication rounds configurable is proposed. 
It attempts to blur the correlation between the number of the login 
rounds and the number of the user-images.  
3.5. Variation of the number of user images in each round   
The number of the pass-images included in the challenge-set 
differs for each authentication round. It is, also, possible that the 
challenge-set may not include any user-images, i.e. pass-images, at all. 
Through the introduction of such additional unknowns, not only does 
an attacker have to determine whether this particular round includes 
any pass-images but, if they assume it does, they would have to guess 
how many  of the user's images were presented in the challenge-set in 
that round and they would have to decide what those images were. 
3.6. Inclusion of 'no pass-image(s) is/are presented' 
This is a two-in-one approach that while it aims to solve the 
restriction in humans’ memory, it also helps to fight the intersection 
attack [8, 11].   
3.7. Randomization of the image positions on each round 
H-IBAS-H randomly varies the location of images within the 
challenge-set and varies the decoy images in the challenge-set itself on 
every authentication round. This would mean that the system could 
not be attacked by recording a student's responses and attempting to 
replay them at later times.  
3.8. Proceeding on error 
If a student fails to correctly identify their pass-images in any 
single round of authentication, H-IBAS-H does not terminate and 
neither does it inform the students/users of their error(s) but the 
authentication process proceeds as normal. H-IBAS-H tells the users 
whether their authentication is successful only at the end of the 
authentication process. This would ensure that a malicious entity 
cannot exactly determine the point of failure. 
3.9. Retry sessions and locking accounts 
To minimise brute force attacks, H-IBAS-H denies access after a 
number of unsuccessful attempts to authenticate. However, care 
should be taken when blocking students' accounts as not to open the 
doors to the denial of service attacks. Legitimate users can reactivate 
their accounts through emails or through their administrators.  
3.10. Reverse to previous login rounds is prohibited 
H-IBAS-H does not allow going back to the previous 
rounds/pages. This is to eliminate a possibility that the attackers could 
brute-force attack the images presented on the challenge-set.  
3.11. Refreshing at the login rounds means continuation  
If a login round is refreshed; H-IBAS-H takes the user to the next 
login round. It is obvious that this technique helps fight the 
intersection attack as well. 
 
4. USER STUDY 
Following the implementation of H-IBAS-H, a user study was 
conducted which involved three phases:  
1.   Development of a user questionnaire. 
2.   Documentation of the hypotheses of the H-IBAS-H developer.     
3.   Conduct of the questionnaire with real users.    
4.1. H-IBAS-H settings  
For the user study purposes, H-IBAS-H pre-set mode was 
operated which was set to work with 4 pass-images, at least 2 training 
rounds, 4 login rounds and a challenge-set of size 21.Users were 
allowed to retry to log in up to 3 times.  
4.2. Development of a user questionnaire     
A seven-page user questionnaire was developed. It aimed to:  
1. Build a trust relationship between the   interviewer and the 
interviewee(s).It served to filter the participants into different groups.  
2. Discover the reasons behind the users’ choices of their pass-images.  
3. Assess the time consumed while registering and   logging with H-
IBAS-H.      
4. Assess the ease of use of H-IBAS-H.  
5. Obtain the users’ opinions as in where H-IBAS-H stands in 
comparison with other authentication systems in terms of speed, ease 
of use and joy of use and many more.  
6. Find out the reasons behind the inability by some users either to 
register or to authenticate with H-IBAS-H.  
7. Assess other different areas that are not covered above.  
4.3. Documentation of the hypotheses  
In  this  phase,  the H-IBAS-H  developer  documented  his  own  
thoughts  and  assumptions  of what  the answerers  to  the survey 
questions would be. These hypotheses are based on the readings and 
the background research that the H-IBAS-H developer has formerly 
conducted. The readings involved close examination of the survey 
data collected and found by the Awase-E and Déjà Vu user studies. 
These hypotheses will be compared with the real results that the        
H-IBAS-H user study would yield. 
4.4. Conduct of the H-IBAS-H experiments  
The third phase of the user study involved conducting three 
experiments; the pilot survey, the one-time experiment and the       
four-week experiment.    
4.4.1. The pilot survey  
The  pilot  survey  is  defined  as  “a  preliminary  survey  
undertaken  to  test whether  a  survey questionnaire has been properly 
designed” [16]. The pilot survey, carried out in the H-IBAS-H project, 
could be thought of as an initial study that aimed to solve any 
ambiguities in the questionnaire.  In  addition,  it served  to  get  a  feel  
from  the  'real'  users  about  their experience with H-IBAS-H  
software. The survey questions were edited accordingly and              
H-IBAS-H was technically adjusted so that it performs its 
functionality in a better user-friendly environment.  
4.4. 2.The one-time experiment  
In this part, the survey targeted the ECE department, staff and 
students. Since surveying the entire ECE department was neither 
practical nor possible within the time allowed, there was a need to 
survey a reasonable sample of the ECE. For this purpose, the random 
stratified sampling was used. 
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4.4. 2.1. Random stratified sampling  
Random Stratified Sampling is where as the population is divided 
into subpopulations (strata) and random samples are taken of each 
stratum [12]. Overall, it can be stated that the two main reasons for the 
use of the stratified sampling were firstly to ensure that the distinctive 
groups within the ECE population are adequately represented in  the  
sample,  and  secondly  to  improve  efficiency  by  gaining  a greater  
control  on  the composition of the sample [13-14].  In  addition,  the  
use  of  the  stratified  sampling makes  it  possible  to work  out  the  
variances between  the  different  groups, i.e. strata.  Thus,  it  would  
be  possible  to  deduce  whether  the differences  in  age  or  on  the  
educational  level  have  a major  influence  on image-based 
authentication systems. 
4. 4.2.2. Conduct of the one-time experiment  
The ECE population was divided into 5 distinctive groups which 
are; the first year group, the second year group, the third year group, 
the Masters + PhD group, and the staff group, which included the 
lecturers, system administrators, and the technicians.  A  sample  size  
of  equal  percentage,  10%  of  each  group,  randomly  selected,  has  
been surveyed. As  for  the  participants,  all  of  them  have  used  and  
currently  use  student  or  staff portals.  Also,  they  are  all  familiar  
with  the  ATM  machines and, undeniably, they are  all  familiar with  
the  traditional user name and  password  systems. The experiment 
was mostly conducted by means of face-to-face interviews. During the 
experiment, the participants were invited to firstly register and log in 
with H-IBAS-H and then to answer the survey questions.    
4.4. 2.3. Data cleaning  
At  this  part,  a cleaning  approach  was  conducted  to  eliminate  
all  the  unreasonable and biased answers.  
4. 4.3. The four-week experiment  
The main objectives for this experiment are to:  
1. Inspect whether the number of experiences with H-IBAS-H has an 
effect on the   participants’ answers.  
2. Examine the effects of updating the student's pass-images after 
becoming familiar with the old ones in terms of whether the new pass-
images would be confused with the old ones.    
3. Study the effects of having more than one image-set.    
4. Evaluate the participants’ ability to recognise their images over a 
period of four weeks.    
4.4. 3.1. Conduct of the four-week experiment  
4. 4.3.1.1. Week 1  
20  randomly  selected  participants,  all  from  the  ECE,  were  
asked  to  register  and  to authenticate  with H-IBAS-H. Then, they 
were all asked to fill in a survey. 
4.4. 3.1.2. Week 2  
The 20 participants were asked to authenticate to their 
corresponding accounts using H-IBAS-H and they were required to 
fill in the corresponding survey.  
4. 4.3.1.3. Week 3  
Two experiments were conducted as follows: 
1. Participants were firstly asked to authenticate and then they were 
asked to fill in an identical survey to that of week 2.   
2. Participants were invited to create a new account with H-IBAS-H. 
Then, they were asked to authenticate with their new pass-images and 
were asked to fill in an identical survey to that they filled in week 1. 
4. 4.3.1.4. Week 4  
Three experiments were conducted here as follows:  
1. First of all, the participants were asked to authenticate to their newer 
account using H-IBAS-H. Regardless to whether they passed or failed, 
the participants were, then, asked to complete the corresponding 
survey.  
2. Secondly,  the  participants were  asked  to  authenticate  to  their  
‘older’  accounts  that   they created in week 1. They were, also, asked 
to fill in the corresponding survey.  
3. Thirdly, the participants were asked to use the ‘flexible’ mode 
where they were allowed to freely choose the number of the pass-
images and the number of the training and login rounds.  
 
5. DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1. Success in the usability of H-IBAS-H  
The survey results show that the rate of success has been high, 
both with the registration and the authentication with H-IBAS-H. This 
high rate of success has been shocking since a success above 90% was 
never expected. This is due to the complicated authentication 
algorithm used, i.e. 4 pass-images are randomly distributed on random 
locations on the 4 challenge-sets on the 4 login rounds.  Yet, 
astonishingly 94.3% of the total participants were able to successfully 
authenticate. The  following  factors  are  believed  to  have  some  
direct  or  indirect  relationships with  the mentioned success:  
1. Flexibility in key generation.    
2. Exclusion of similar key inputs.    
3. Disallowance of a key input to appear more than once. 
 
5. 2. Flexibility in key generation  
5.2.1. Observation 
The  flexibility  in  key  generation  represented  in  the  
“reload/refresh”  feature  contributed towards  the  high  success  in  
registering and  authenticating  with H-IBAS-H.  
5.2.2. Discussion  
In H-IBAS-H, flexibility in key generation is granted by means of 
refreshing the registration page. When the registration page is 
refreshed, different key inputs, i.e. images, are shown, and thus 
become available for selection. The users can, therefore, select the 
keys, i.e. image-sets, that they are the most comfortable with and 
which they think they can recognise easier and better. This  flexibility  
has  proven  to  be  a  key  factor  to  the  high  success  in   H-IBAS-H 
on the usability side.   
Currently, H-IBAS-H has a bank of 783 images, from which keys 
can be created. This is, by far, more than the bank of the traditional 
password-based and PIN-based systems which only rely on some of 
the ASCII characters. In total, there are 256 ASCII characters [15]. 
However, not all the password systems support the full ASCII 
characters.  In fact, many of them only support 36 characters; the 26 
English alphabets and the 10 numerical digits. This is particularly true 
at an ATM machine where only the 10 numerical digits, 0 to 9, are 
permitted to be used as inputs to form a 4-digit PIN. Thus, it can be 
concluded that H-IBAS-H provides higher flexibility in terms of key 
generation than that provided by the password and the PIN systems. 
While the flexibility in key generation can be a key factor in the 
success of authentication systems, and can open the doors to their 
world-wide popularity, as in the password systems, such flexibility 
could, however, result in some negative consequences. For example, it 
could become  a  time-consuming  task,  especially  in  image-based  
systems where  users  can  spend quite a  time browsing  for  images. 
Similarly, this is also found in text-based systems where users can 
spend a lot of time trying to think of a new, unique, and memorable 
password that they have not used before. Nevertheless, H-IBAS-H 
users have expressed that they found it fun browsing for new and 
different images. In fact, some of them stated that it was more of a 
hobby to them rather than an effort. Where users enjoy refreshing the 
registration page to view more images, the fact that they spend time 
doing that becomes insignificant. Flexibility in key generation could, 
also, lead to the creation of describable keys, an issue that image-
based systems, in particular H-IBAS-H, struggle to avoid. Such an 
issue can, however, be remedied if all of the describable and weak key 
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inputs, i.e. images, are manually removed such that all the remaining 
images are thought of as being potential candidates for image-sets. 
5.2.3. Finding  
For image-based systems, “flexibility in key generation” should be 
provided if the system is desired to gain high success in usability! This 
is an example of a piece of information that could not have been 
possibly learnt without the implementation of H-IBAS-H and then 
without the development and the conduct of the corresponding survey.  
5.2.4. Image-based versus text-based authentication systems (in 
terms of flexibility) 
Flexibility  in  key  generation  is  as  good  in  image  systems  as  
in  password-based  and  PIN-based systems. In fact, it may well be 
actually better in image-based systems since the number of key inputs 
available to choose from could be, by far, more than that available in 
the text-based systems.  
5.2.5. Evaluation  
H-IBAS-H offers better flexibility in key generation than the 
traditional password and PIN systems. Hence, image-based systems 
may have brighter future than the password systems.  
5.3. Exclusion of similar key inputs  
5.3.1. Observation 
The vast majority of the similar key inputs in H-IBAS-H have 
been manually removed. This has greatly contributed towards the 
mentioned high success with H-IBAS-H. 
5.3.2. Discussion  
The  images  used  in  H-IBAS-H  have  been  downloaded  from  
the  random  art  website, “www.random-art.com”.  In  total,  a  bank  
of  1000  images  has  been  initially downloaded,  some  of which 
were similar or even too similar. At the initial testing of H-IBAS-H, 
and in particular while the ‘pilot’ study was being conducted, it was 
deduced that the similar images needed to be removed. Thus, most if 
not all of the similar images were manually eliminated and the image-
bank in H-IBAS-H was reduced down to 783. Similar images,  mainly  
the  ‘too’  similar  ones,  created  huge  confusion  to  users  and  
presented  a threat to both the usability and the security of H-IBAS-H. 
It threatened the usability in terms that  it confused  the users and  it 
endangered  the security of H-IBAS-H since  it can be more than 
reasonable to assume that users are likely not to pick images for their  
image-set if they think  that  they would not be able  to distinguish 
between  them as  they are  too similar. Thus, from  an  attacker point 
of view,  the  too  similar  images on a particular  challenge-set  can be 
ruled  out  on  the  assumption  that  they  could  have  not  been  
chosen  as  pass-images.  The manual  removal  of  the  similar  key  
inputs  has  been,  thus,  a  wise  remedy  to  such  threats, leading  to  
the success of H-IBAS-H on both the usability the security sides.  
In addition to the deletion of similar key inputs requiring a lot of 
physical effort, exclusion of similar key inputs might not be possible 
in some scenarios with image-based systems such as where images are 
automatically created during the run time! This is one reason why 
such approach was not adopted with H-IBAS-H.  
It is worthy of note that H-IBAS-H is not the only authentication 
system that uses keys, some of its inputs were similar. Yet, the     
recall-based systems still include some similar key inputs. For 
instance, the traditional password system allows the use of capital ‘I’ 
as in the word ‘Inn’ and also allows the use of lower case ‘L’ as in the 
word “lamp”. In addition to the number one ‘1’, the pipe “|”  is  also  
allowed  as  a  valid  key  input  in  some  password  systems. Clearly, 
the password inputs, “I l 1 |” are too similar and may well be 
confusing! Although they have been around for decades, they still 
exist as valid ‘inputs’ in use by the password systems. However, since 
the text-based  passwords  depend  on  recall  rather  than  recognition  
and  then  input  of  keys rather  than  identification of keys, such an  
issue may not be of concern with  the recall-based systems.  
5.3.3. Finding  
For image-based authentication systems, “similar images” should 
be eliminated if the system is desired to score a high percentage of 
success in usability. A supportive factor to this finding is that the vast 
majority of the students who failed either to log in or to complete their 
training rounds mentioned that the similarity between the key inputs, 
i.e. images, was a key factor to their failure.  
5.3.4. Image-based versus text-based authentication systems (in 
terms of similar key inputs) 
If H-IBAS-H  is  compared  against  a  password  system  that only  
employs  the  alphabets  and digits, H-IBAS-H  is  found  to  offer  as,  
if  not  better,  dissimilar  key  inputs  as  the  password system.  This  
is  despite  the  fact  that H-IBAS-H  currently  uses  783  key  inputs  
while  the mentioned  password  system  only  uses  36  key  inputs  or  
62  key  inputs  if  upper  and lower cases were considered.  
5.3.5. Evaluation  
While  the  similar key  inputs  can characterize  a major  concern  
for  recognition-based  systems,  recall-based  systems,  on the other 
hand, do not hugely suffer from such problems. Consequently,  it can 
be  rightly stated that  the  ‘too’  similar  key  inputs  are  an  inherent  
issue  in  recognition-based  systems! The exclusion of such key inputs 
is, therefore, a significant factor for the success of recognition-based 
systems, such as the image-based systems. 
5.4. Disallowance of a key input to appear more than once 
5.4.1. Observation 
In text-based systems, it is permitted to use one key input more 
than once in a password or a PIN. By contrast, this is strictly 
prohibited in H-IBAS-H. That is to say, the image-sets that the users 
have to select must include different images. A user is not allowed to 
use the same image more than once in any single image-set.  
5.4.2. Discussion 
Password-based and PIN-based systems are classically considered 
to offer better usability than the H-IBAS-H since, for one reason, a 
key input, in the password and PIN systems, is allowed to be used 
more than once when generating a key. 
The knowledge that the key inputs cannot be repeated might have 
actually better helped the users to successfully register and, then, 
authenticate with an authentication system, such as H-IBAS-H.  On 
the other hand, such knowledge could be a free give away to attackers. 
However, a success of 98.4% in the registration stage and, then, a 
success of 94.4% in the login stage with H-IBAS-H endorse that it is 
not necessary to allow a key input to appear more than once for 
image-based systems to enjoy a high percentage of success. 
5.4.3. Findings 
 It might be not necessary to allow repetition of key inputs when 
forming a key in image systems to achieve high success.  
 The ban of repetition in key inputs might be in favour of success 
with image systems on both, the security and the usability sides. 
5.5. Choice of key inputs in image-based systems 
This section attempts to demonstrate the characteristics of the 
images favoured by users. It essentially answers the following 
questions; what are the popular images from a user point of view 
when registering with H-IBAS-H? Or, on what basis, have the users 
selected their images when registering?  
5.5.1. Findings 
By and large, a successful image-based authentication system 
should use images that are made up of 1 or 2 colours, consisted of 1 or 
2 shapes, different, unique, appealing and meaningful. However, it 
may be not necessary for an image-based system to be successful to 
use images that are made up of 1 or 2 colours or images that are made 
up of 1 or 2 shapes. As long as there is sufficient distinction between 
the images, such that it can be said that the vast majority of the images 
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offered are distinctive and unique, an image-based system can still 
enjoy a high degree of success. 
An image-based system that uses ‘too’ similar or “too” abstract 
images is likely to fail from a usability point of view.  
Moreover, there is adequate evidence that shows that users prefer 
photographic pictures, such as pictures of real objects, animals, 
famous people…etc. This supports the findings of Awase-E. In H-
IBAS-H, such photographic pictures were ruled out on the basis that 
such images could provide clues as to which pass-images a user is 
more likely to select. 
5.5.2. Image-based versus text-based authentication systems (in 
terms of favourable key inputs) 
Meaningful and appealing key inputs are also keys to usability 
success on both kinds of the knowledge based systems; the recall-
based one and the recognition-based one. In recall-based systems, 
users more than often choose passwords which are either of personal 
meanings to them, such as their love partners, or passwords that they 
understand what they mean. For example, the chances of choosing 
“love” as a password is, by far, more enormous than the choice of 
“segjfiqbweh” which does not mean anything. The same applies to 
image-based systems, the chances of choosing an image of Princess 
Diana as a pass-image is, considerably, greater than the choice of 
some random abstract meaningless image. Since only abstract images 
are allowed in random art, users still look for the most appealing ones, 
at least the most appealing to themselves!  
5.6. Evaluation of the time consumption in H-IBAS-H  
This section assesses the time taken when using H-IBAS-H as an 
authentication system. It investigates the issue by looking at the time 
taken while creating keys and the verification of every key input in the 
challenge-set. 
5.6.1. Key Creation  
Key creation in image-based systems takes no longer than the key 
creation in password systems. Actually, as the survey data show, it 
takes relatively less time than that taken for the choice of a new and a 
unique password. 
5.6.1.1. Possible Reasons 
Some users, in fact, commented that they always find it hard to 
come up with a new and unique password since they already have a 
number of different passwords for a number of different purposes that 
they are struggling to remember. Thus, according to them, it takes 
them quite a longer time to think of a new memorable password that 
they have not used before. Where there are plenty of keys already 
chosen by an individual, the individual’s ability to come up with a 
new key becomes tougher and hence can take up long time. This is 
more of an issue to text-based systems rather than the image-based 
ones since the latter are by far less common than the former ones.  
5.6.1.2. Findings 
As far as the key selection, i.e. the image-set creation, is 
concerned, image-based systems are by no means more   time-
consuming than the password systems. 
5.6.2. Verification of every key input in challenge-set 
It may be not necessary for a user of an image-based 
authentication system to verify every key input of the offered key 
inputs in a particular challenge-set. Instead, a quick skim through 
might suffice to identify the real authentication key. Thus, the time 
spent to do such an operation is considerably less than the time that 
would have been spent on the verification of every image of the 
offered 21 * 4 images. Consequently, while password systems are, 
undoubtedly, faster since no such identification is required, the image-
based systems can be reasonably fast, though not as fast as the 
password systems. Hence, the image-based systems still offer a 
reasonable degree of usability, in terms of speed. 
5.7. H-IBAS-H versus PIN-based and password-based 
authentication systems ( in terms of ease of use) 
Overall, it can be stated that the majority of the surveyed ECE find 
image-based systems easy to use. This is despite the fact that the ECE, 
in the one-time experiment only, still believes that the password and 
the PIN systems are still easier to use than the image ones. The 
reasons for such a belief can be related to many factors such as: 
1. All users are used to password and PIN systems and have 
had experiences with them for years while they only had a single 
experience with H-IBAS-H. 
2. PIN and password systems are relatively faster according to 
users since they only involve 1 login round compared to 4 login 
rounds in H-IBAS-H. 
3. With password and PIN systems, the users are only required 
to type in their user-name and their corresponding password all on one 
page, while in H-IBAS-H, the users are expected to identify their 4 
images in 4 pages, each of which offers 21 images with no knowledge 
as of the number of their pass-images shown at each round and neither 
do they have any knowledge in regards to whether a particular login 
round contains any pass-images or not in the first place. 
Despite all of this, the users still find H-IBAS-H easy to use and 
not only that but it can be CLEARLY stated that the users find the 
image-based authentication systems to be the most fun to use 
compared to the password-based systems  and the PIN-based systems 
used at the ATM machine. 
What is more appealing is that the one-time experiment results 
show that the ECE participants place a great amount of trust on H-
IBAS-H. Most of the users have related this trust due to the technique 
used in the system and, astonishingly, to its complications. What can 
be learnt from this is that users are likely to place their trust on the 
more complicated systems! 
5.8. Evaluation of the failure scenarios 
This discusses the reasons that have led to the failure of some users 
to authenticate using H-IBAS-H. The survey data show that the 
following reasons were key figures to the failure. 
5.8.1. Similarity between images 
 This has been discussed earlier. 
5.8.2. Existence of too abstract images 
Although abstract art is ideal from the point of view that it barely 
gives any clues about the users, the too abstract art can be an issue that 
might stand against the success of the       image-based systems. Thus, 
only the ‘too’ abstract keys should be eliminated for the image-based 
systems to be highly successful! The high rate of success achieved by 
H-IBAS-H can be used as evidence that the ‘abstract’ random art 
could be finely used as keys in the recognition systems. 
5.8.3. Level of uncertainty is high 
To secure high success in image-based systems, the level of 
certainty provided should be carefully planned such that the 
information necessary to the completion of the registration and the 
authentication of the system is provided but in a way that does not 
compromise security.    
                              
6. THE FOUR-WEEK EXPERIMENT 
6.1. Authenticating with H-IBAS-H/the old account   
Table 1  shows  the  percentage  as  well  as  the  number  of  the  
participants  who successfully managed to log in with the H-IBAS-H 
in week 1, week 2, week 3, and week 4. 
Week Successful 
logins (%) 
Successful 
Participants 
     Total 
Participants 
1 100% 20 20 
2 80% 16 20 
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3 100% 16 16 
4 93.8% 15 16 
Table 1: Overall users’ statistics in the four-week experiment 
6.2. Authenticating with H-IBAS-H/the new account  
Table 2  shows  the  percentage  as  well  as  the  number  of  the  
participants  who successfully managed to log in to their second 
account with H-IBAS-H  in week 3 and week 4. 
Week Successful 
logins (%) 
Successful 
Participants 
Total 
Participants 
3 100% 16 16 
4 75% 12 16 
Table 2: Overall users’ statistics in the four-week experiment after creating a new 
account 
6.3. Discussion  
The fact that 75% of the participants were able to authenticate 
successfully to their new account in week 4 is surprising!  What  is  
even  more astonishing  is  that  , 93.8%  of  the participants  were  
able  to actually authenticate  successfully to their old account in week 
4, as shown in Table 2. The  reason why  this  is  shocking  is because,  
initially,  it  was  assumed  that  the  success  rate  with  H-IBAS-H  
would  decline dramatically  based  on  the  assumption  that  most  of  
the  participants  would  get  confused between  their newer and  the 
older pass-images. This assumption originated  from  the  initial 
thought  that  the  new  images  would  be confused   the  old  ones  
since  the  participants had gained more familiarity with the old pass-
images as they had used  to log  in with them for  3 weeks. Yet, the 
vast majority of the participants managed to successfully distinguish 
between their images and used the right ones to log in to the right 
account.  
The minimum interval of authentication was 7 days and this is 
probably less frequent than the use of an ATM in participants’ daily 
lives. It is, also, by far less frequent than the use of the traditional 
passwords’ systems to authenticate to the participants’ portals. What 
can be learnt from  this  is  that  authentication  stability  can  be  
provided  even  where  the  image-based authentication  system  is  not  
frequently  used!  This finding supports what the Awase-E developers 
also found [8, 11].  Since  image-based  keys may  be  still  recognised  
and  distinguished  over  longer  periods  of times,  image-based 
authentication  systems might  represent valid and  effective  solutions  
for some infrequently used websites that require authentication. 
Equally well, they can be applied to any organisation that needs to 
authenticate its irregularly-visiting clients. 
6.4. Findings  
 Authentication stability can be provided even where the       
image-based authentication   system is not frequently used!   
 Image-based  authentication  systems  may  be  effective  on  both  
the  longer  and  the   shorter terms.  
 Users may effectively use different image-keys for different 
purposes.     
 Random art keys may be efficient for use by the image-based 
authentication systems on both the longer and the shorter terms. 
6.5. Image-based systems versus text-based systems (in terms of 
authentication stability) 
Previous  research  data,  as  in  the Déjà Vu  and Awase-E  data,  
showed  that  the  text-based authentication systems performed poorly 
in situations where the password or the PIN was not often used. Thus, 
based on the outcomes of the four-week experiment conducted by    
H-IBAS-H,  it  can  be  concluded  that  image-based  systems might  
provide  better  authentication stability than the text-based systems in 
situations where the authentication system is infrequently used. 
6.6. Time consumption and ease of use 
In short, the four-week experiment has shown that the more 
experiences that the users have with an image-based system, the faster 
and the easier they think it becomes for them. In fact, the participants 
in the four-week experiment have gone as far as rating H-IBAS-H to 
be faster and easier than the text-based authentications systems used 
for the University portal and the ATM machines. This clearly brings 
fine news for the usability of the image-based authentication systems 
and, hence, it pushes such systems forward.  
6.7. Flexible mode 
The participants found the flexible mode in H-IBAS-H easy and 
fun to use, and less time-consuming than other text-based 
authentication systems. Thus, this meets one of the objectives of       
H-IBAS-H which is to design an authentication system that is fun and 
easy to use!  
 
7. RECALL OR RECOGNITION? 
7.1. Observation  
On selection of their pass-images, most of the participants tend to 
relate their images to some real-world objects.  For  example,  one  
‘male’  student  stated  that he  selected  his  4  pass-images based on 
the following; 1- One appears as a highway when you look at it from a 
faraway distance.2- One looks like a piece of marble. 3- One looks 
like a curtain.4- One looks like a human female breast. At the time the 
student was selecting his pass-images, he had no view whatsoever to a 
highway, or to a female breast. Thus, he had to recall how they look 
like from the top of his head. The student was asked to log in to their 
account on week 1, week 2, week 3 and week 4. Before  he  logged  
into  his  account,  the  student was  asked  to  talk  about  his         
pass-images. He actually described them all as above. He stated that 
he had all his pass-images in mind. As he was performing his first 
login round,  the student skimmed  through  the challenge-set  to  look 
for  an  image or  images  that  look(s)  like a highway, or  a piece of 
marble, or  a curtain or a female breast. As soon as the student found 
one of them, he ‘recognised’ that it was his pass-image, thus he 
selected it. He used a similar technique in the subsequent login rounds.  
This was just a single observation of one student.  Many students, in 
fact the majority of the students, used similar techniques. Certainly,  
there  is  no  need  for  a  user  to  precisely  and  exactly  remember  
how  their  image looks like before they log in. For example, before 
they perform their recognition, a user could say ‘I know that my image 
looks like an eye but I am not sure about its background colour’. 
When the user is offered the ‘challenge-set’, and once their eyes 
glance over the challenge- set, they would immediately recognise their 
pass-image. H-IBAS-H facilitated this since most, if not all, of the   
similar images have been manually removed! 
7.2. Findings  
The  observation  above  suggests  that  the  image-based  systems  
that  use  random  art  as  their authentication keys depend on both, 
recognition and recall;  
• They depend on recognition in terms that they show the ‘decoy’ 
and the ‘pass-images’   on  a  challenge-set,  and  the user  is  required  
to  identify  the  correct pass-images  as soon as they recognise them 
from the decoy images.   
• And they depend on recall in terms that the users recall their 
pass-images before and while they perform their authentication. Here, 
the users actually ‘remember’ how their pass-images  look  like,  
though  not  precisely,  and  then when  the  system  offers them the 
challenge-set, they ‘recognise’ them. Therefore, in image-based 
systems, in particular, the ones that apply random art, the separation 
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between ‘recall’ and ‘recognition’ is not a wise one and neither is it an 
easy one, as most of the users of these systems depend on both, the 
recall and the recognition when authenticating with such systems. 
7.3. Image-based versus text-based systems (in terms of precise 
and partial recall) 
While  text  systems  entirely  depend  on  the  recall,  the  image-
based  systems  depend  on  the recognition and the recall. Since the 
latter ones depend on two senses, this may be the reason behind the 
high success of image-systems compared to the recall systems.  
Another  distinction  between  the text-based  systems  and  the  
image-based  systems  is that  the  text  systems  depend wholly  on  
the  ‘precise’  recall  of  the  key,  i.e. almost or partial  recall  is not  
sufficient.   A  ‘partial’  recall of  the key might, however,  suffice  to 
successfully  authenticate  in  image-based  systems  since  while  they  
mainly  depend  on ‘recognition’,  they also depend on  recall. 
Elimination of the similar images makes the image-based systems that 
depend on recall and recognition powerful systems, i.e. more usable 
and hence more popular. 
8. FREQUENCY OF KEY UPDATES 
The frequency of key updates can influence the security of any 
authentication system. Where users are more enthusiastic to update 
their keys, as in Awase-E, the security level is likely to escalate. On 
the contrary, where users are less keen to update their keys, as in       
H-IBAS-H, the security level could decline. As the survey data imply, 
the reason why users are less enthusiastic to switch their keys in        
H-IBAS-H is because they find the random art keys hard to remember 
since they are abstract and random. If users are allowed to use their 
own keys in image-based authentication systems, the frequency of key 
updates in such systems is likely to be higher than that of other 
authentication systems. Therefore, the usability and the security might 
be better in such image systems. However, the employment of users’ 
own keys could, on the other hand, trigger another security problem 
where the users’ keys can be attacked by educated guesses based on 
the knowledge of users’ personal tastes. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
H-IBAS-H demonstrated how image-based systems could be 
effectively used in the process of authentication of a particular 
purpose.  In  addition  to  the  technical  achievement accomplished by 
the successful implementation of the system within the scheduled 
time, the analysis operation conducted on  the data collected  from a 
hundred and ninety surveys  from real  users  has  afforded  valuable  
contribution  to  the  research  society,  specifically  to  the          
authentication field. In addition, it has also provided a precious insight 
that offers the potential for considerable future work.  
A functional system has been developed which allows users to 
authenticate using image keys in two modes, a flexible mode and a 
pre-set mode. Where  users  can  select  the  number  of     pass-images 
and  the number of  login  rounds  that  they  desire  in  the  flexible 
mode,  the system administrator can force the users to select a certain 
number of pass-images and go through a certain number of training 
and login rounds in the pre-set mode.   
The high rate of success, achieved by users attempting to 
authenticate, strongly supports the arguments of those seeking to push 
image recognition forward as a viable alternative to the widely-used 
text-based systems. H-IBAS-H  suggests  that  the  flexibility  in  key  
generation  as  well  as  the  elimination  of similarity between key 
inputs are two key players that need to be supplied in order to secure a 
high success in an image-based authentication system.   
H-IBAS-H has proven  that  the  image-based  authentication  
systems,  even  the ones  that use random art keys, can provide 
stability  in authentication even where  the frequency of use of the 
authentication system is as low as once a week.  
Perhaps the most important finding of all in this project is that      
H-IBAS-H discovers that users depend  on  both  recognition  and  
recall  when  using  image-based  authentication  systems. H-IBAS-H 
explains that where  text-based authentication systems rely entirely on 
the ‘precise’ recall of  the password  or  of the  PIN  to  achieve  a  
successful  authentication,  image-based  authentication systems,  in 
particular the ones that use random art keys, rely on both recognition 
and recall, but here a ‘partial’ recall  might  suffice  to  accomplish  
success  when  authenticating.  One  significance  of  this finding  is  
the  fact  that  at  the  start  of  this  project,  and  based  on  the  
background  research conducted,  the  H-IBAS-H  developer  thought  
that  the  image-based authentication systems rely solely on 
recognition. 
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